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"The truth is", said Justice Holmes in The Common
Law, "that the law is always approaching, and never reach-
ing consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from
life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history
at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed
off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases
to grow".'
It is quite apparent that time has not sapped these words
of their vitality, and an examination of any branch of the
law today will reveal the present continuation of those
processes of adoption and retention to which the Justice
referred. In the immediate field of inquiry, it will be noted
that this language has as much, if not more, applicability
than one might find in the more fully developed and older
branches of the law, this being so perhaps because of the
fact that slight variations are much more noticeable when
they occur in a relatively new field of the law with its
attendant paucity of decisions than when they occur with
the same frequency in an older field thoroughly studded
with decisions.2
* Of the Baltimore City Bar, LL.B., 1923, University of Maryland School
of Law. This article, and a companion article to follow, grew out of a talk
delivered by this author at the Wednesday Law Club of Baltimore City.
** A.B., 1942, Johns Hopkins University; Co-Chairman Student-Editorial
Board Maryland Law Review.1 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
' It was not until 1916 that there was any statutory provision as to a right
of way rule in Maryland. The rule was originally enacted in Md. Laws
(1916) Ch. 687, and remains practically unchanged today.
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In view of the fact that under the statutory right of way
provisions there generally arise two separate types of
cases, namely those dealing with pedestrians injured by
automobiles, and those concerning the collision of two auto-
mobiles at an intersection, it has been decided to treat each
separately. To that end then, the present article will deal
with the pedestrian accident phase.2 We consider here only
those cases arising under the statutory right of way pro-
visions, including those cases containing a discussion of said
provisions, and this article is not intended to serve as a
general discussion of any and all types of accidents involv-
ing the pedestrian-automobile set-up.
"All pedestrians shall have the right of way at street
crossings in the towns and cities of this state, except where
traffic is controlled at such crossings by traffic officers, or
traffic control devices. Between street crossings in such
towns and cities, vehicles shall have the right of way."3
This is the statutory language applied to that portion of
the right of way law as it applies to pedestrians, and while
many of the cases mentioned hereafter were decided prior
to 1947, still there has been so little change in the statutory
wording that it has been decided to refer throughout to
this 1947 provision whenever reference to the statute is
required to be made.
At the outset of this discussion it should be noted that
aside from the problem of what constitutes a street cross-
ing, and those other ancillary matters as to whether or not
the accident occurred in a city or town, or whether the
street crossing was controlled by traffic officers, or devices,
there seems at first glance to be little room for judicial
interpretation of this provision. A study of the cases
arising under this provision, however, shows quite clearly
that the most troublesome part of the whole statute, so
far as interpretation is concerned, is the phrase about which
the entire statute is erected, namely, "right of way". By
many persons, pedestrians as well as motorists, this phrase
adopted by the legislature, was thought to confer on them
2a The companion article to follow will deal with the phase of the collision
of two automobiles at an intersection.
3 Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 66 , Sec. 181 (a).
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a privilege or right which it became their duty to enforce
even at the risk of harm to another, and we find them
frequently asking the courts to vindicate them for having
insisted on being accorded what they considered to be their
"right of way". Time and again we find our Court of
Appeals reiterating for the benefit of those litigants whose
etymological view of the phrase was not fluid enough to
admit of any construction save that of an absolute right,
that the right thus granted by the legislature was not abso-
lute, even though unqualified in any manner by the words
of the statute.4 The problem then comes to this, what legally
recognized preference is conferred on the parties concerned,
that is pedestrian and motorist, by the statute? It must,
a fortiori, be conceded that the language of the statute
does not seem to present any solution, for no qualifications
are there listed, and to answer the query thus posed we
must turn to a consideration of those decisions stemming
from this legislative enactment.
The Court in 1925 had before it the case of a pedestrian
who had been knocked down by a truck while crossing the
street in the pedestrian crossing at an intersection, and it
took that opportunity to discuss generally this very prob-
lem. After setting forth the section of the act relating to
pedestrian right of way the Court said:5
"Section 163 required that the truck should give
pedestrians the right of way at street crossings, and
the effect of such statutory requirement is that drivers
of automobiles, when approaching street crossings and
passing over the way used by pedestrians must slacken
the speed of the automobile and have the same under
such control as to be able to avoid a collision with a
pedestrian, either by stopping the automobile or di-
verting its course .... The plaintiff had the right to
assume that the driver of the truck would obey the
law, and that, if the speed and direction at which he
See Crunkilton v. Hook, 185 Md. 1, 42 A. 2d 517, 521 (1945) : "We hold
that an operator of a motor vehicle has no right to assume that the road
is clear, but must be reasonably vigilant . . . and must anticipate the
presence of pedestrians upon it"; and Bush v. Mohrlein, 62 A. 2d 301, 302
(Md. 1948) : ". . . the right of way, is not an absolute privilege . . . the
statute gives only a relative right dependent upon the particular circum-
stances. ....
8 Merrifield v. Hoffberger, 147 Md. 134, 140, 127 A. 500 (1925).
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and the automobile were moving, if continued by both,
would bring them in contact, the driver of the auto-
mobile would so slacken the speed of his truck, or
divert its course, as to avoid the collision, because this
he was bound to do .... Vehicles may have the right
of way on a portion of a street or highway set aside for
them, but at crossings all drivers, particularly of motor
vehicles, must be highly vigilant and maintain such
control that on the shortest possible notice they can
stop their cars so as to prevent injury to pedestrians."
We find in this language a positive command as to the
motorist, that at a street crossing he be highly vigilant,
and that he be able to stop on the shortest possible notice.
Nothing is here mentioned about the correlative duty of
care on the part of the pedestrian who is crossing. It is
simply pointed out that it was his right to assume that the
driver would obey the law and slacken speed for the plain-
tiff in the cross-walk. There was no intimation that the
pedestrian would be guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law, if, under the same circumstances he as-
sumed that the driver of the vehicle would reduce his speed,
even after it should have been apparent to the pedestrian
that the driver was not in fact going to obey that require-
ment. The lack of any extended discussion of the possibility
of contributory negligence on the part of the pedestrian
was not a thing to cause comment at that time, because
in the prior cases involving similar factual situations the
Court had contented itself with a brief mention of such
eventuality. In one of these cases the only reference to
the duty of the pedestrian in crossing the street was made
after the Court had laid down the doctrine that a pedestrian
at a street crossing may assume that a vehicle will not be
driven on the wrong side of the street, when it said in
reference to such pedestrians,' . . . "although, of course,
they must use due care according to the circumstances".
A later case, Panitz v. Webb, was concerned with an
accident at a street crossing controlled by traffic signal,
where the pedestrian was crossing on a green light and was
struck by motorist making a right hand turn with the same
" Brown v. Patterson, 141 Md. 293, 302, 118 A. 653 (1922).
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light in his favor. The Court pointed out that the presence
of the traffic signal expressly took the case out from under
the statute, and held that the rights of the parties were to
be determined by common law, and that under such law
they were relative and reciprocal rights. "Each was bound
to anticipate the presence of the other, and to take cogni-
zance of the physical properties of the machine operated
by defendant's agent, as well as of the fact that the invita-
tion given by the traffic signal was to both of them."7
Should there have been no further decisions or cases
arising under the statute, it would not be inconceivable
that reasonable minded men would believe that in this
right of way law there were areas of absolute right on the
part of both parties. Certainly such was the view, some
two years later, of the defendant who had struck a pedes-
trian who was crossing the street in the middle of the block.
Predicated upon the belief that at such a place the statute
gave the motorist an absolute right and required the pe-
destrian to cross at his peril, the defendant submitted a
prayer that the court instruct the jury that the plaintiff
was prima facie guilty of contributory negligence if, at the
time of the accident he was "walking in the south drive-
way of Roland Avenue in about the middle thereof at night
time", or "was at or near the center of said south bound
driveway between street crossings". This prayer was re-
jected by the trial court and in considering it on appeal the
Court of Appeals, in Nelson v. Seiler, said:8
"The inference is that this is the legal consequence
of the provision of the law (Code, art. 56, see. 209)
that between street crossings vehicles shall have the
right of way. It is not clear that the prayer supposes
the plaintiff to be between street crossings, but taking
both prayers to intend to place him there, his being
so, while it is one of the facts to be considered on the
question of negligence, is not sufficient standing alone
to establish negligence prima facie, to establish it,
that is, in the absence of any other facts. No statute
gives the fact that effect, and it would not logically
follow, for a pedestrian has a right to cross the streets
T Panitz v. Webb, 149 Md. 75, 83, 130 A. 913 (1925).
3 Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 76, 139 A. 564 (1927).
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between crossings, and it is conceivable that a man
might be injured while crossing with care and without
contesting the right of way there. There are statements
in the authorities that negligence is prima facie shown
by this one fact but it seems to us inaccurate. The ques-
tion is one of ordinary care only, entirely for the jury,
and we think it would be going too far for the court
to give the fact prima facie effect."
Here, for the first time, we see the clear delineation
by the Court of the rights of both parties. What had at
first appeared to be a clearly drawn rule of the road, now
became not a rule at all but rather a mere guide post point-
ing disputants to the test of "ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances". This is stated in so many words by the Court
in its opinion. Consider the effect of this decision on the
statute. Is it not "judicial repeal"? Does the statute retain
any meaning in the face of such construction by the Court?
We have on one hand the legislative enactment that "be-
tween street crossings ... vehicles shall have the right of
way",9 and if this is to be accorded any effect there must
be some sort of positive preferential treatment given the
motorist by the courts when he is involved in an accident
with a pedestrian who is not crossing at the cross walk.
Can it be said that he is given such preference in any way
when the Court says, as it did here, "the question (of the
negligence vel non of a pedestrian in crossing in the middle
of the block) is one of ordinary care only. . . ."0 It is sub-
mitted that this test would be applied in the absence of a
statute (as in Panitz v. Webb" where Court held presence
of traffic control took case out from the statute) and if we
apply the same test with, as well as without, a statute,
where then is any preference to be found? The Court was
never troubled with this matter, for it simply refused to
consider that any such problem was raised in the first
instance. If such a postulate is to be accepted, it is then
possible to follow through with the other cases arising
under the Act, and give as much or as little effect to it as
9 Supra, n. 3.




is desired, and such was the solution here. Apparently no
litigant ever raised the points mentioned, and it has never
become necessary for the Court to formulate a reply. None-
theless, it is suggested that here can be found the pre-
cursor of a policy of disregarding the words of the statute
whenever it became necessary to do so, in order that the
desired result be achieved in decision. In the Nelson case
it was impossible for the Court to use the argument that
the situation was controlled by the common law rule of
right of way since the case was certainly within the statute;
and yet, in overruling the defendant's objection here that
the trial court improperly rejected a prayer drawn upon
the theory that the statute as passed made the act of cross-
ing in the middle of the block prima facie evidence -of con-
tributory negligence it reached a result which it is sub-
mitted could only be justified under the common law rule
of relative and reciprocal rights, though the Court based
its result on the statute.
One possible rationale might exist, and that is an argu-
ment that the Court was not refusing to give effect to the
statute since the statute deals with primary negligence
only, and that the Court was free to graft onto it such
requirements as are legally sound with reference to the
problem of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
Using such an argument as a touchstone, it would logically
follow that the Nelson case12 was not one to cause any com-
ment. The problem of contributory negligence was handled
in the usual manner, by the application of the time tested
rule of "ordinary care under the circumstances", and it
was in the sole province of the jury to decide whether or
not the plaintiff had acted without the requisite degree of
care in crossing the street in the middle of the block. Such
a line of reasoning seems to lose sight of the fact that it is
substance and not form to which the courts most often
claim to give obeisance. Certainly an argument predicated
on the hypothesis that such a statute deals only with
primary, as opposed to contributory, negligence, would
have its foundation grounded on fallacy, for it is more
12 Supra, n. 8.
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than elementary that primary negligence is the concern
of the plaintiff in all these cases, and unless some positive
preference is given to the defendant, in the form of judicial
rulings as to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff,
then there is no such area of right, qualified or otherwise,
available to the motorist when he is involved in an acci-
dent with a pedestrian while the latter is crossing at a
point other than the crosswalk. To follow a policy of let-
ting all such cases go to the jury is to disregard the statutory
directive that, "between street crossings ... vehicles shall
have the right of way". 3
Whether or not any such considerations were presented
to the Court in the next three years it is impossible to say,
but we do find definite evidence which points to the fact
that in some later cases there was an awareness of the in-
congruity of the position taken in the Nelson case,'4 and
we find a desire to give at least lip service to the statute.
In 1930, the Court had before it the case of a child playing
in the middle of a block, and, chasing across the street
after a ball, was struck by the defendant's right front
fender. There was evidence that the child never looked to
see if the street was clear before running across the street.
The only witness adverse to the defendant was in a house
some 100 feet away, and all she could testify to was that
she thought that defendant was speeding." The plaintiff
came to the Court of Appeals, appealing from a directed
verdict below, and in affirming this ruling, the Court dwelt
briefly on the same type of question as was raised in the
Nelson case.16 It was contended by plaintiff that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence of the child was for the
jury under the same type of reasoning as was availed of
in the Nelson case,'7 but this time the Court viewed the
problem from another angle, and would not go along with
the plaintiff's contentions. It said in part:'s
'
8Supra, n. 3. See State v. Belle Isle Cab, infra, n. 55.
'5Supra, n. 8.
Slaysman v. Gerst, 159 Md. 292, 150 A. 728 (1930).
16 Supra, n. 8.
17 Ibid.
Supra, n. 15, 300.
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"It is also to be remembered that this accident took
place between street intersections at approximately
the middle of the block, at which place, under the
Code, art. 56, sec. 209, automobiles are given the right
of way over pedestrians .... It does require that be-
tween street intersections pedestrians yield the right
of way to vehicles. 19 The difference between accidents
at, and those between, regular crossings is that in the
latter the rule of ordinary care requires the motorist
to exercise less and the pedestrian more care to avoid
injury."
Here then appears to be language which narrows con-
siderable the broad statement that the question of the con-
tributory negligence of one crossing the street in the middle
of the block is, "one of ordinary care only, entirely for the
jury... "20 Yet, when viewed objectively it is to be noticed
that still there is here no intimation that the statutory right
of way given to the motorist between street crossings is
of any definitive character. The Court here does state
that the statute gives the motorist the right of way in
such situations, but the important thing, and the matter
of most grave concern to the motorist, namely, how far
the Court will go in vindicating him should he exercise
this grant of right of way, is left unanswered. He is told
that, while the rule of ordinary care is still applicable to
him in such a situation, still because of the statute he
may exercise less care to avoid injury to a pedestrian in
the middle of the block than he must at an intersection.
Such a rule is not one easily capable of application, and
indeed it smacks of the comparative negligence rule
adopted by a few states2 but never applied in Maryland.22
It seems strange that in this case the Court, in affirming
the lower court's action in directing a verdict for the
19 Italics supplied.
Supra, n. 8.
n Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Davis, 197 Ark. 830, 125 S. W. 2d 785 (1939);
Savannah Electric Co. v. Crawford, 130 Ga. 421, 6 S. E. 1056 (1908).
2See Webb Pepploe v. Cooper, 159 Md. 426, 151 A. 235 (1930) ; Edwards
v. State, 166 Md. 217, 170 A. 761 (1934) ; Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller,
153 Md. 264, 138 A. 1 (1927); Sillik v. Hoeck, 168 Md. 689, 178 A. 852
(1935) ; Universal Credit Co. v. Merryman, 173 Md. 256, 195 A. 689 (1938) ;
all cases of pedestrian suits against motorists where defense was that of




defendant, failed to clarify its position any further than
it did, for certainly the situation was hand-tailored for some
affirmative statement as to the duty imposed by the statute
on a pedestrian crossing in the middle of the block; but
it was not until it had considered the next case of the
same genre that we can find an affirmative statement with
reference to just such a matter. 3 There the Court was
dealing with a case wherein the defendant was speeding
in a car with poor brakes. Plaintiff was crossing Charles
Street from east to west in the middle of the block at
midnight in a well illumined section. Plaintiff testified
that he looked north and south and saw nothing, and that
he was almost all the way across the street when he was
struck without warning by the defendant. Defendant ad-
mitted that he was speeding, that he had poor brakes,
and that he never sounded his horn because he never saw
the plaintiff until just a second before he struck him. He
said that his headlights were on. The Court in holding
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, said that the plaintiff must have done one of two
things. He either failed to look at all, or he looked and saw
the defendant coming, but tried to beat him across the
street. In its comment on this latter possibility the Court
went straight to the heart of the problem, and dealt fully
with it. 24
"The plaintiff's attempt was all the more culpable
because the statutory rule of the road was that vehicu-
lar traffic between street crossings shall have the right
of way over pedestrians. . . . While this statutory
provision is not alone sufficient to establish contribu-
tory negligence.... 23 yet it serves to give character to
the plaintiffs act, and is a pregnant circumstance,
because the statutory rule imposed upon such pedes-
trians an added degree of responsibility, and so, of
care, in looking for approaching automobiles . . .be-
tween intersecting streets. The statute is a legislative
recognition of the danger of vehicular traffic to pedes-
trians in passing across the streets of cities and towns,





and an effort to diminish the number of injuries and
fatalities from this source by giving the pedestrian
the right of way at street crossings ...and by con-
ferring on vehicular traffic the right of way over
pedestrians crossing such streets between the public
crossings."
A study of this statement is revealing, in that we see
now that the Court has taken a definite position on the
matter of the impact of the statute on the question of
contributory negligence. The Court will refuse to go along
with any doctrine which would call for the interposition
by the judiciary of an absolute bar to recovery by any
plaintiff who was guilty merely of crossing a street at a
place other than at a street crossing, but at the same time
it points the way towards acceptance of a doctrine less
strictly phrased, but reaching practically the same result.
The plaintiff here failed to yield the right of way as required
by the statute, and it would be difficult to imagine a less
attractive position than the one occupied by the defendant,
and yet withal, the result was that recovery was denied.
To hold that the primary negligence of the defendant driver
was not sufficiently made out here would seem to be an
untenable position in the light of the facts set out in the
opinion, and if we accept as a fait accomplit the primary
negligence of the driver, then the resulting reversal of a
failure to direct a verdict below can only be explained by
reference to the plaintiff's acts which were of such a clear
and undisputed nature as to amount to contributory negli-
gence in and of themselves.
In our study of the plaintiff's actions in this connection
it must be born in mind that the Court, in directing a verdict
for the defendant, must view the evidence with the con-
struction most favorable to plaintiff's right to recover.26
Let us examine then, the acts of the plaintiff which were
considered sufficiently culpable to warrant the Court in
holding that they did in fact make him contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff testified that he
had gotten out of a car on the east side of Charles Street,
" Barker v. Whittier, 166 Md. 33, 170 A. 578 (1934).
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which at that point is about 40 feet wide. It was midnight,
but the street was well lighted, and as he looked to both
his right and left he could see no cars coming towards him.
He then proceeded to cross and was almost across when
he was struck by a car coming from his right. He claimed
that the car did not have its lights on at this time. Those
are the facts as set forth by the plaintiff, and if we look
at them in their most favorable light, as the Court had to
do, what is the result? The plaintiff makes out a case of
due care in every act which transpired save only for his
act of crossing in the middle of the block. That was the only
act of his which could be said to have led to the injury since
he was prudent enough in the other matters therein men-
tioned. The Court must have realized its dilemma here
for it stuck to the rule as enunciated in the Nelson case
27
that it is not contributory negligence as a matter of law for
one to cross in the middle of the block-since, the Court
argued, a pedestrian has a right to cross a street at a place
other than the intersection, provided he uses due care and
does not contest the right of way there. However, it was
another matter to justify a defendant's directed verdict
here for one would be hard put to it to find any other
factors on which to base it beyond the fact that the plain-
tiff was crossing in the middle of the block. Nonetheless,
the Court made use of a very convenient judicial device
to circumvent this difficulty when it declared that one
who testifies that he looked and failed to see something
that he was bound to see had he in fact looked, will be pre-
sumed not to have looked; and on the strength of this
as a basis for contributory negligence found for the defend-
ant, reversing, without new trial, the verdict for plaintiff
below when lower court had refused to direct a verdict
for the defendant.
We see then, that while the Court will not go so far as
to subscribe to the doctrine mentioned above (that of
holding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence for
crossing in the middle of the block) it has laid down its
policy in this matter in different words, and yet the net
2 Supra, n. 8.
[VOL. XI
MOTORISTS AND PEDESTRIANS
result seems to be the same in either case. It will refuse
to hold one remediless for merely crossing in the middle
of the block without more, but on the other hand it ex-
tends to the defendant in such a situation an unspoken
promise that it will manage to find those other facts which,
when taken in conjunction with "the pregnant circum-
stance" of crossing in the middle of a block, will complete
the picture of contributory negligence. It is only fair to
point out here, that the Court does not play any favorites
in its application of this doctrine for in later cases where
the plaintiff was crossing at an intersection and was struck
by a motorist, it has held that the advantage or preference
which is given to the pedestrian by the statute does not
absolve him from the duty of observing due care for his
own safety.28
A much more troublesome matter presents itself to us
when we consider the implications of language used by
the Court in the case of Thompson v. Sun Cab Co.2 9 There
in a suit filed by a pedestrian, plaintiff failed to place him-
self in the intersection cross walk where he would have
enjoyed whatever preference the statute gives to those
crossing at such a point. Furthermore the plaintiff failed
to look where he was going because of a heavy rain, and
as he was hurrying across the street without looking, he
was struck by the cab. Following the course charted in its
prior decisions the Court found for the defendant saying
that the plaintiff should have looked and would then have
seen the approaching vehicle in time to avoid it by waiting
for it to go by. Had the decision rested here there would
be no occasion for comment, as it followed along in the
footsteps of prior opinions.3 However, there is in this
21 See Chasanow v. Smouse, 168 Md. 629, 178 A. 846 (1935) where the
court refused to allow the pedestrian to invoke the sanction of the statute
to counter-balance his own contributory negligence in crossing at an inter-
section without looking out for approaching traffic; ci., Sheriff Motor Co.
v. State, 169 Md. 79, 179 A. 508 (1935) where plaintiff prevailed on theory
that even if he had looked, defendant was so far away that it was reasonable
to assume that defendant would wait for the plaintiff to cross. The Court
said: ". . . the statute gave the plaintiff a preference, but it did not absolve
him of the duty of due care. Concededly it was his duty to look before
stepping off..."
170 Md. 299, 184 A. 576 (1936).
8o Supra, n. 28.
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opinion some very troublesome language when it is read
in conjunction with the whole problem under present con-
sideration. The Court in discussing the possibility of an
inference of negligence on the part of the cab said: 31
"An inference of negligence as the cause of an in-
jury cannot be indulged from the mere fact that a
pedestrian is knocked down by a taxicab in a place
where the taxicab had an equal, if not superior, right,
with the pedestrian, to be." 2
Bear in mind that in writing this opinion, the Court specifi-
cally considered this to be a case where the plaintiff was
not crossing at a pedestrian crosswalk,"3 and thus the right
of way preference should be given to the motorist.
Here, once again, the basic conflict between the plain
language of the statute and the interpretation placed
thereon by the Court comes into focus, and brings us
back to the rhetorical question previously posed as to the
problem of the continued vitality of the statute. Can there
be said to be given to the motorist any preference whatso-
ever "between street crossings", if, as the Court states
here, he has only "an equal, if not superior right with the
pedestrian, to be there"? It is indeed difficult to understand
why such a qualification as this was placed upon the statute.
Under common law, the rights of pedestrian and motorist
were relative and reciprocal, and there such a statement
as noted above would be quite in keeping with the realities
of the situation, but with the passage of the statute the
common law as to right of way was at least "qualified". 4
The passage of the statute was, as the Court had previously
pointed out,33 "a legislative recognition of the danger of
vehicular traffic to pedestrians in passing across the streets
of cities and towns, and an effort to diminish the number
of injuries and fatalities from this source by giving the
pedestrian the right of way at street crossings . . . and by
m Supra, n. 29, 307.
0 Italics supplied.
8 Supra, n. 29, 304.
" Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A. 2d 792, 794 (Md. 1948) where the Court
referring to the statutory right of way treated as -to automobiles on inter-
secting streets, said: "The statutory rule qualifies the common law rule




conferring on vehicular traffic the right of way over
pedestrians crossing such streets between the public cross-
ings". No question exists but that it was the intention of
the legislature to make a change in the common law of
reciprocal rights for the pedestrian and motorist in the
streets, and the proposed change called for the investiture
of a preference upon pedestrian under one set of facts, and
upon the motorist under another. This preference, termed
"right of way" by the legislature was given by the statute,
obviously with an eye towards better regulating the con-
duct of each of these parties. Is it not judicial legislation
for the Court to disregard this mandate of preference, and
to say that between intersections a motorist has only
"equal, if not superior rights, with the pedestrian"?35 a
The Court had further opportunity to develop its views
as to the correlative duties and rights of the pedestrian
and motorist, at and between crossings, in the next few
years. In 1936, it had before it the case of a pedestrian
plaintiff who was crossing the street some 150 feet north of
the crosswalk. 6 The defendant was driving north on this
same street, and was passing another vehicle going in the
same direction. It so happened that the defendant passed
the other vehicle just at the time the plaintiff was crossing
the street. The plaintiff managed to cross safely in front of
the car on the right of the defendant, but could not avoid
defendant's car since the defendant in passing had moved
over to the left of the center of the road. In its discussion
of this matter, the Court had to consider the interrelation
between the violation by the plaintiff of the right of way
provision applicable to him, and the violation by the de-
fendant of the rule requiring motorists to keep to the right
of the center of the road.3 7 It said: 38
"The mere fact, however, that a pedestrian crosses
a street between intersections, . .. or that a motorist
crosses the center line of a street, ... is not necessarily
negligence; it is what either does or both do under
u See State v. Belle Isle Cab, infra, n. 55.
Ebert Ice Cream Co. v. Eaton, 171 Md. 30, 187 A. 865 (1936).
87Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 66/2, Sec.
Supra, n. 36, 35.
1950]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
such circumstances that determines the question of
negligence.
"It has been held by this court, contrary to some
text writers, that it is not prima facie evidence of
negligence for a pedestrian to cross a street between
intersections, but that 'the question is one of ordinary
care only, entirely for the jury. Nelson v. Seiler, 154
Md. 65, 77.' "
Here again is language quite reminiscent of that in
the Webb-Pepploe case 9 above. We find the reiteration
of a refusal to bar plaintiff's recovery merely because
he was crossing the street in the middle of the block. Before
any such bar can be interposed the Court wants evidence
of plaintiff's negligence. You will ask then, is it not some
evidence of negligence that the pedestrian crosses in the
middle of the block? Our reply is that in light of all the
decisions of the Court of Appeals it is not that type of
evidence which will justify a court in holding plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, nor
is it even prima facie evidence of negligence on the plain-
tiff's part. A brief reconsideration of three cases will serve
to make this clear, for in each one of them there was
before the Court the problem of whether or not the act
of crossing in the middle of the block would be considered
to be contributory negligence as a matter of law, and in
each the answer was in the negative. You will recall the
language used. In the Nelson case it was:40
"It is not clear that the prayer supposes the plaintiff
to be between street crossings, but taking both prayers
to intend to place him there, his being so, while it is
one of the facts to be considered on the question of
negligence, is not sufficient standing alone to establish
negligence prima facie, to establish it, that is, in the
absence of any other facts . .
and in the Webb-Pepploe case:
"While this (violation of the statutory provision
giving right of way to motorist between intersections)
Supra, n. 23.




is not alone sufficient to establish contributory negli-
gence ... yet it serves to give character to the plain-
tiff's act.. .."
and finally in Ebert Ice Cream Co. v. Eaton:42
"The mere fact, however, that a pedestrian crosses
a street between intersections ... is not necessarily
negligence, it is what (he) does under the circum-
stances that determines the question of negligence."
In these cases we find set forth the policy of the Court
of Appeals in this matter. In each case where the defendant
has requested a directed verdict on the grounds that the
violation by plaintiff of the statute amounted to contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law, the request has been
rejected.43 There is no requirement in the substantive law
of evidence that there be more than some evidence to sup-
port a verdict. When we examine this rule closely we find
that what it really amounts to is that it is a denial of due
process to render a verdict against defendant without any
evidence to support such result. 4 However, the courts do
not, beyond the "scintilla of evidence" rule,45 require that
there be any certain amount of evidence presented, before
the jury, or court, will be justified in rendering a verdict
based on such evidence. If there be evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant, and if there be no evidence
of negligence on the part of the plaintiff-or if the only evi-
dence of negligence on the plaintiff's part be that type of
1Supra, n. 36.
41 The Webb-Pepploe v. Cooper decision was based not on the fact that
plaintiff crossed in middle of block, but that he failed to look while crossing.
"For cases holding that the jury will not be allowed to infer facts from
evidence which is so light and inconclusive that no rational mind could
infer from it the fact sought to be established see: Treusch v. Kamke, 63
Md. 279 (1885) ; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, 188 Md. 119, 52 A. 2d
249 (1947) ; Garozymski v. Daniel, 57 A. 2d 339 (1948) ; Goldman v. Johnson
Motor Lines, 63 A. 2d 622 (1949). Cf., Drahley v. Gregg, 75 U. S. 242, 8
Wall. 242, 19 L. Ed. 409 (1868) ; Geschwendt v. Yoe, 174 Md. 342, 198 A.
720 (1938) ; Gohlinghorst v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 177 Md. 157, 8 A.
2d 919 (1939) ; holding that if there is any evidence, however slight, legally
sufficient as tending to prove plaintiff's case, the case may not be taken
from -the jury.
" See Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co. v. State, 109 Md. 186,
72 A. 651 (1909) where it was held that in order to require that an issue




evidence which the court refuses to recognize judicially
and therefore does not take the case from the jury-the case
goes to the jury for verdict, and if they do not consider
the plaintiff's contributory negligence to be satisfactorily
made out by defendant in his case, they may find for the
plaintiff. It is more than demonstrably clear that crossing
in the middle of a block without more is not considered
to be sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff to justify the Court in taking the case from the
jury. 45a
There is a great temptation here to state that failure of
the pedestrian to yield the right of way to the motorist
between intersection (and vice versa) is not any evidence
of negligence at all, but that there must be proven on the
part of the person attempting to establish negligence some
other independent facts which themselves, and apart from
the violation of the statute, go to make out a case. However,
while this thesis might have been argued with some suc-
cess prior to 1946, it was at that time definitely rejected by
the Court in Brown v. Bendix. There the plaintiff was
a pedestrian who had alighted from a bus at an intersection.
The bus was still discharging passengers when the plaintiff
walked in front of it to go across the street. Defendant
was passing the bus at this time and struck plaintiff as she
stepped out from the left front of the bus. The evidence
was undisputed that the motorist failed to stop or yield the
right of way to her in accordance with the statutory require-
ment, but despite this dereliction on the part of the de-
fendant he argued strongly that it was not any evidence
of negligence whatsoever. His contention was that the
Court had repeatedly refused to hold that the mere viola-
tion of the right of way statute by a pedestrian amounted
to contributory negligence per se, and that it should not
now take the position that a violation of the same statute
on the part of the defendant without more could be said to
be that type of evidence which would justify a finding of
'" See n. 55, infra.
187 Md. 613, 51 A. 2d 292 (1946).
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primary negligence on his part. In refusing to give effect
to this argument the Court said:
"It should have been obvious to the automobile
driver that the bus was stopped to discharge passen-
gers, and that some of them might attempt to cross.
It was his statutory duty to stop and yield the right
of way. Failure to do so is at least some evidence of
negligence."4
It is submitted that this language is, when considered
in the light of all the prior decisions on this subject, a
distinct departure from the course previously followed by
the Court in these pedestrian accident cases, and presages
a doctrine not formerly recognized by the Court of Appeals.
Nicholson v. Kreezmer typifies the Court's earlier position
in refusing to create a prima facie case for the pedestrian
plaintiff from the defendant's violation of the statute. The
case is short and can be set out most conveniently for study
in the Court's own words :49
"Nicholson, on a foggy night, with drizzling rain,
was crossing Paca Street at the regular place for pe-
destrians and when he was almost across he was un-
expectedly struck by the motor truck. There was no
evidence of the movement of the truck before the col-
lision, none that it was driven fast or otherwise im-
properly, and none that it was lacking in lights. There
was testimony that the truck ran on 50 feet after the
collision, but that might have been due to surprise
and consequent delay in stopping. A finding of negli-
gence would have to be made from the mere fact of the
collision. And that is not enough, for collision even at
crossings might occur on foggy nights without negli-
gence."
With that opinion the Court affirmed a directed verdict
for defendant.
The marked contrast between the Nicholson and the
Bendix cases is to be noted. It has been pointed out that
with the passage of time more and more qualifications
and refinements have been wound round the statute under
" Ibid., 619.
48 Italics supplied.
"Nicholson v. Kreczmer, unreported in 178 Md. 680, but reported in full
In 13 A. 2d 596 (1940).
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consideration until what once appeared to be a clear legis-
lative mandate as to the right of precedence at and between
street crossings has now taken on so many complexities as
to make it well nigh impossible of definitive description,
and it may well be that the cases cited herein will serve as
the most irrefutable illustration of that process.
A glance at the Nicholson case will shed light on the
legal problem facing the Court. There the situation con-
cerned itself with a pedestrian who was struck while ad-
mittedly at a pedestrian cross walk. There was no evidence
at all of any contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, and the only evidence of negligence on defendant's
part was that he went some 50 feet after the accident.
With these facts before them, the Court sustained a directed
verdict for defendant on the grounds, not of contributory
negligence, but rather that there was no evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff was in
the favored position so far as the street crossing was con-
cerned, and the defendant did strike him while he was in
this favored position, and yet the Court said that without
more there was no evidence of negligence on the part of
the defendant. Why should this type of case be decided
any other way than all other negligence actions wherein
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to make out some act
or acts of the defendant which act or acts were tortious
or negligent as to the plaintiff? Certainly no rule is more
firmly established in our law of torts than that before
plaintiff can secure a judgment (other than default) he
must make out his case against defendant. It now remains
to decide just what is needed in the automobile-pedestrian
case at an intersection before that case will be said to be
made out. The Court is in effect saying that the protection
or privilege given in so many words by the statute to the
pedestrian at an intersection will not be enough standing
alone to amount to any of that type of evidence of primary
negligence which it is permissible for the jury to consider,
or on which they might base a verdict for the plaintiff. No
other explanation of this case is possible since it is to be
remembered that there was a directed verdict here on the
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ground of lack of primary evidence of negligence on defend-
ant's part. It is suggested that this is the very point which
the Bendix case so successfully clarifies, and yet it must be
noted that almost thirty years intervened between the pas-
sage of the original statute and this positive recognition
of the legislative mandate.
The facts in the Nicholson case were strikingly similar
in many ways to those in the Bendix case, and yet the re-
sults were diametrically opposed. In the Bendix situation
the plaintiff walked out in front of a bus which had stopped
at the corner to discharge passengers, and she was struck
by the defendant just as she stepped out from the front
of said bus. In fact it might be pointed out that here the
case was not as strong for the plaintiff as it was in the
Nicholson case, because here the plaintiff could not have
looked where she was going, while the other plaintiff's case
was silent as to this point. We have then two plaintiff's
crossing at intersections, and the evidence as to the negli-
gence on the part of the defendants was as sketchy in the
one case as in the other. In both cases, the trial court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant on the grounds that there
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant,
and yet the Court in the Bendix case reversed this action
of the lower court while the decision below in the Nicholson
case was allowed to stand. Before going on here it must
be noted that there was present in the Bendix case one
additional element lacking in the other situation and that
was the presence of another part of the right of way statute
passed in 1943,50 dealing with the duty of a motorist ap-
proaching a vehicle stopped at an intersection to allow a
pedestrian to cross, but it is not believed that this section,
whether applicable or not to the case would have changed
the result. In the final analysis, the Court had to decide
whether or not it was evidence of negligence that the
defendant should strike plaintiff while the latter was in
1 Ch. 1007 of Acts of 1943 as codified by Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 66 ,
Sec. 181 provides: "(b) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked
crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at any intersection to permit a
pedestrian to cross the roadway driver of any other vehicle approaching
from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle".
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the cross walk. The Court answered this in the negative
in the Nicholson case, but in 1947 an affirmative view was
taken, and we think rightly so.
It is contended that in the Bendix case, there was laid
down, as noted above, a doctrine which, it is felt, most
nearly corresponds to the effect sought after by the legis-
lature in the matter of pedestrian right of way. The Court
is here giving effect to the statute by making the pedes-
trian's right of way at an intersection actually of some
legally recognizable value. In this case alone, the fact that
the plaintiff did have such a right swung the scales in her
favor, the Court saying when speaking of the defendant's
actions,51 "It was his statutory duty to stop and yield the
right of way. Failure to do so is at least some evidence of
negligence." This is the first direct out and out setting
forth of the benefits of the statute that has been noted to
date. Certainly it is a total departure from the theory of
the Nicholson case, and it is submitted that if such a view
of these cases is to be taken in the future there will be
much closer harmonization between the results desired by
the legislature and the results secured in the courts.
A more difficult matter will be presented in the situation
where the accident occurs in the middle of the block, for
there the motorist will be asking that he be accorded his
right of precedence or privilege, and the solution must be
then approached in a negative manner. It has been pointed
out before52 that in such situations a very different type of
question is presented than when the accident occurs at the
crossing. At the crossing the pedestrian has the right of
way, and to defeat his claim the motorist must show that
he was himself free from any negligence or that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in the accident. The
Court has repeatedly held that where the pedestrian has
the right of way (at the crossing) the question of his con-
tributory negligence is for the jury," and the practical
"Supra, n. 46, 619.
12 Circa, n. 39, 40.
"Brown v. Patterson, 141 Md. 293, 118 A. 653 (1922) ; Legum v. State,
167 Md. 339, 173 A. 565 (1934) ; Vizzini v. Dopkin, 176 Md. 639, 6 A. 2d 637;
Wintrobe v. Hart, 178 Md. 289, 13 A. 2d 365 (1940).
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result is that the jury never finds the plaintiff guilty of
such contributory negligence but rather finds for the plain-
tiff. To allow these cases to go to the jury is to give the
plaintiff pedestrian that advantage which he so greatly
desires, and which in the final analysis the statute in so
many words gives him. In the other situation where the
plaintiff pedestrian is struck in the middle of the block
the Court is presented with another problem. The question
here is not one dealing with primary negligence, but rather
it is concerned solely with the question of contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. Should the Court follow a strict
rule, which they have many times rejected,54 namely that
the act of crossing in the middle of the block is prima facie
evidence of contributory negligence? Certainly in the face
of the oft repeated rejection of this doctrine, there seems
little likelihood that it will be presently adopted, but until
some method be devised of giving preference to the motorist
when he is involved in a between crossings accident, we
submit that the problem of pedestrian right of way will
be but half solved. The plaintiff being allowed to go to the
jury on the question of contributory negligence in suits
where the accident occurred at an intersection is certainly
being accorded whatever protection or privilege the legis-
lature had in mind when it passed the statute, and thus
half of the problem is answered. However, when we turn
to the privilege of the motorist between intersections, it is
submitted that he secures little protection by letting a
jury decide whether or not the plaintiff contributed to
the accident by his actions of crossing in the middle of
the block plus whatever other evidence the motorist has
adduced at trial. One can not truly state that the entire
matter has been brought to a solution until some other
statutory method is devised to give effective preference to
the motorist.55
14 Supra, n. 8, and n. 36.
'In State v. Belle Isle Cab Company, 71 A. 2d 435 (Md. 1950), decided
and available to the authors only after this article was written and at the
printers, the Court of Appeals, with a dissent by Judge Markell, held that
the motorist is "not bound to anticipate" that a pedestrian will cross the
street between intersections. The authors are informed that the case will
be separately noted in this Review, but wish to direct attention to its close
relevance to much of what has been covered by this article.
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